

OTTOMAN MILLET SYSTEM AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF BOTH
YUGOSLAVIAS AS PRE-CONSOCIATIONAL EXPERIENCE FOR THE
MACEDONIAN AND THE BOSNIAN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY

ABSTRACT

In the theory of consociation it is said that countries that adopt this model for building a sustainable democracy in deeply divided societies would be far more successful in its application if those particular societies have previously experienced some type of political culture or tradition of peaceful coexistence, tolerance. The common denominator for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia is the long period of history where they were a part of such historical creation as the Ottoman Empire and both Yugoslavias, the Socialist and Royal one. The purpose of this paper is to answer the question of how the political systems of these historic creations contained elements that could be characterized as a pre-consociational experience encountered by these two countries, if we take into consideration that some authors, well versed in the matter of consensus democracy, argue that the Ottoman Empire, and both Yugoslavias regarding the manner in which they managed their multicultural diversity of the territory, took certain measures that can qualify as typically consociational.

Keywords: Ottoman millet model, Royal and Socialist Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Macedonia, consociation.

INTRODUCTION

The consociational model of democracy has been one of the more important developments within political science in the last half-century. As a form of government designed to encourage stable democracy in countries that are deeply divided by ethnicity, religion, or other social cleavages, consociationalism has become widely recognized by political scientists due to its real influence on constitutional design in new democracies, however it remains largely unrecognized by other scholarly disciplines.²

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² See: Howe, Philip J., "Imperial Austria as a Precursor to Consociational Democracy," in *Re-thinking European Politics and History*, ed. A. Pasieka, D. Petruccelli, B. Roth, Vienna: IWM Junior Visiting Fellows' Conferences, 2012.

The consociational concept is founded on the idea of building a sustainable democracy in deeply divided societies, and it was developed by Arend Lijphart as early as the late 60s of the XX century in theoretical and empirical terms in order to build a stable system in a deeply (fragmented) divided society.³

At the end of XX and beginning of XXI century in a pleiad of multicultural societies in the Balkans (primarily Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, but also Kosovo) there appeared to be “an urgent need to find a durable democratic model of politics in order to prevent ethnic conflicts and violence in a manner acceptable in a democratic society”.⁴

The element of consociation in these countries “was established as a tool of post-conflict interethnic accommodation and enshrines group rights and political representation to varying degrees”.⁵

In order to be successfully implemented, the consociational arrangement in the societies that undergo this type of constitutional engineering must have some previous historical experience, i.e. must have experienced some type of political culture or tradition of coexistence, peaceful coexistence, or tolerance.

The roots of today’s power sharing arrangement in these countries, according Florian Bieber lie in the late socialist Yugoslav system. In addition, there are earlier traditions of interethnic accommodation, going back to the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy^{6, 7}

In this sense, “The Balkan region is known for its ethnic and cultural diversity, and we could say that Macedonia is the epitome of that diversity... Macedonia with its distinctive configuration, distinctive ethnic, religious and linguistic groups does an exceptionally well job of illustrating the idea of complex nature of multicultural societies”.⁸

The same goes for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which according to Benjamin Reilly is a paradigmatically divided society, and many consider it to be the most divided European

³ See: Ванковска, Билјана, *Политички систем*. Скопје: Бомат, 2007: 152.

⁴ Атанасов, Петар, *Мултикултурализмот како теорија, политика и практика* Скопје: Евро-Балкан Прес, 2003: 8.

⁵ Bieber, Florian, “Power Sharing and Democracy in Southeast Europe” *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, Special Issue, 2013: 129.

⁶ This only applies to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

⁷ Ibid.,

⁸ Младеновски, Ѓорѓе, “Република Македонија: во потрага за една нова мултикултурна конфигурација”. Во: Предавања на XLI меѓународен семинар за македонски јазик и култура, Охрид 2008. Скопје: „Универзитет Св Кирил и Методиј“, 2009: 219-221.

state.⁹ The political history of this country, according to Mirjana Kasapović, has been characterized by

The coexistence and the conflict of three major religious and ethnic segments: Catholic-Croatian, Muslim-Bosniac, and Orthodox-Serbian. The religious segments began taking shape as far back as the 11th century following the collapse of the integral Christian community into the Western and the Eastern Church, and were intensified during the Islamization of a part of the Bosnian Christian population under the rule of the Ottoman Empire (1463-1878). Historically speaking, the religious cleavages were the first to emerge; in the processes of the establishment of modern ethnic and national communities they morphed into ethnic and national cleavages.¹⁰

The ethnic diversity that exists in these states “is unlikely to disappear overnight. The widely accepted model of assimilation into the nation-state is questionable, and it becomes evident that it is often unsuccessful and there is a growing feeling of alienation among those of ethnic minority origin”.¹¹

The purpose of this paper is to provide an answer as to how the political system of the Ottoman Empire, but also of both Yugoslavias, especially considering the way in which they 'run' the multicultural diversity of their territories by introducing certain elements that were on the line of the consociation, can be characterized as some kind of preconsociational experience that these two societies faced. Both countries, without exception, in the late 90's of XX and at the beginning of the XXI century, underwent constitutional and consociational engineering by the international community in order to reformat their political systems, by introducing elements of consociation, as was the case of the Dayton Peace Accords (1995) and OFA (2001).

The theoretical concept of consociational democracy

The essence of the consociational model according to one of the Founding Fathers, Arend Lijphart, is that political elites cannot represent the interests of citizens, but only the ones of the individual segments (communities), whether they be ethnic, linguistic or

⁹See: Reilly, Benjamin, *Democracy in Divided Societies. Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001: 143.

¹⁰ Kasapović, Mirjana, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Consociational or Liberal Democracy?” *Politička misao*, Vol. XLII, No. 5, (2005): 7.

¹¹ Атанасов, *op cit.*, 8.

religious, by wide agreement of political parties or elites that represent different parts in such deeply segmented societies.¹²

Lijphart founded the model of consensual democracy on four pillars:

- Power has to be shared in a grand coalition government which will consist of all the most relevant representatives of the most important segments of society;
- Each segment has veto power in order to protect its vital interests, if the adoption of a certain decision could potentially be threatened;
- Adequate representation in the institutions of the system (proportional representation) which should lead to a proportional distribution of the impact of various segments in public areas;
- Autonomy of the segments, which means relative autonomy of the segments on issues pertaining to their members. The consociational model indicated three predominant forms of autonomy that the segments may have:
 1. *Administrative* - with decentralization (through local government);
 2. *Political-territorial* - the exercise of the legislative function on certain issues (in the territory of one segment);
 3. *Cultural* - limited to issues related to education, culture, use of language, religion (referring to cultural, ethnic, religious, but not a territorially defined group).¹³

Lijphart built this Pattern model of democracy on the experiences of several Western European countries, primarily his native country the Netherlands, but also of those of Switzerland and Belgium. His critics believe that the entire theory is built on not the most appropriate examples. For example, the lines of cleavage in Dutch society have never been so dramatic to call into question the survival of Dutch society and state, and Switzerland, despite national and religious diversity, never constituted a deeply divided society. Therefore, this theory, as Vankovska notes, “experiences a far greater success as an abstract model, rather than in practice.”¹⁴

On the other hand, another group of authors consider that the achievements of some historical creations are being devalued, such as the Habsburg Monarchy and its concept of cultural autonomy, which was debated by Austro-Marxist School led by Otto Bauer and Karl Renner, as well as the Ottoman Empire with its millet system, as unrecognized historical predecessors of consociationalism. Also, one brand author of the theory of consociation,

¹² See: Ванковска, *op cit.*, 152-153.

¹³ Ibid, 155-157.

¹⁴ Ibid, 164.

Gerhard Lehmbruch, believes that the millet system in the manner in which it was established in some provinces of the Ottoman Empire belongs to the tradition of conflict resolution that fosters the development of a consociational political culture.¹⁵

The millet system as a source of consociational political culture

With the advent of the Ottoman Turks in the Balkans and the expansion of their Empire brought about a development of a type of state and society that was characterized by a multi-ethnic, multi-national, multilingual, and a multi-religious patrimonialism. The so-called millet system played an essential role in the maintenance of such diversity.¹⁶

For others authors, such as Boztemur, the Millet System was at the basis of the Ottoman multi-cultural and multi-religious social system. It was based on the separation of different religious groups from each other and on the recognition of each denomination as legal entity with specific communal –‘segmental’- rights and privileges.¹⁷

For Sara Barbier, the Millet was:

ultimately inclusive as it gathered all the people of the same faith independently of their place of living. Constituted as one of the basic administrative units of the state, the Millet provided the non-Muslim peoples with the possibility to cultivate a sense of identity and belonging to their communities, to protect their own culture, traditions, language and religion while acting within the framework of the Empire and in the respect of the authority of the Sultan.¹⁸

That is the reason why science continues to cite it as an important precedent and model for minority rights.¹⁹

If Gerhard Lehmbruch speaks about the Ottoman Empire, primarily its millet system as a source of consensual political culture, then one question that demands an answer is which aspects of the political system of the Ottoman Empire can note such a political culture?

¹⁵ See: Lehmbruch, Gerhard, “A Non-competitive Pattern of Conflict Management in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Switzerland, Austria and Lebanon”, in: McRae, Kenneth (ed.), *Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies*, Ottawa: McLelland and Steward, 1974: 93.

¹⁶ See: Младеновски, *op cit.*, 222.

¹⁷ See: Boztemur, Recep, “Historical Foundations of Multiculturalism in the Ottoman Empire”. Papers prepared for “Challenges of Multiculturalism in Eastern and Central Europe” conference, 2004: 2.

¹⁸ Barbieri, Sara, “Ottoman Millet System and National-Cultural Autonomy. A Distance Dialogue European Consortium for Political Research” paper prepared for 41st Joint Sessions, University of Mainz 11-16 March, 2013:2.

¹⁹ For more see: Sigler, Jay, *Minority Rights: A Comparative Analysis*, Greenwood: Westport Conn. 1983; Thornberry, Patrick, “Is There a Phoenix in the Ashes? International Law and Minority Rights” *Texas International Law Journal*, 15: 421-58; Van Dyke, Vernon, *Human Rights, Ethnicity and Discrimination*, Greenwood: Westport Conn. 1985.

“Advancing a first generalization, the Ottoman Millet System was standing on the principle of cultural Autonomy”²⁰, because ultimately the autonomy of the segments according to the father of consociation, Lijphart, along with the grand coalition government were the primary principles of his theoretical model, regardless of the fact that it was developed more than half a century after the collapse of Ottoman Empire. Therefore, as Bauböck notes, the Ottoman Millet System for religious groups is referred to in literature as the closest precedent to his conceptualization of cultural autonomies for national/linguistic communities.²¹

The Millet was one of the basic administrative units of the Ottoman state in which religious groups carried out their administrative affairs, besides protecting their socio-cultural and religious interests. Also the leaders of the Millets were part of the Ottoman state bureaucracy. That is the reason why this historical model of non-territorial arrangement for autonomy is still considered in social sciences as an important model for management of ethno-religious diversities.²²

According to the same author, the Millet had a clearly arranged structure – “The edit clearly outlines the structure of the ‘Millet’ System: a community whose leader acted as a member of state bureaucracy and whose election had to be approved by the Sultan. The community was led by a Council which was in charge of national affairs and which had the right to control over religious and cultural matters”.²³ In this way, according to Mladenovski, the Empire had social and political control over various ethno-religious groups, thus placing them into the several broad categories, the so-called millets.²⁴

A turning point of the development of the Ottoman Empire is the *Tanzimat* reform, which, according to Barbieri, “would have opened to the concept of ‘Ottomanism’ which brought to the recognition of all members of the religious communities as equal citizens of the Ottoman Empire, overcoming group logic and breaking the borders of the Millets”.²⁵

In the *Tanzimat* period, for Berkes, the Millets became also protagonist of the debate concerning the reform of the educational system. However this attempt to secularize the educational system stopped before the unwillingness of some of the Millets to keep their

²⁰Barbieri, *op cit*, 2.

²¹ See: Bauböck, Rainer, “Political autonomy or cultural minority rights? A conceptual critique of Renner’s model”, in E. Nimni (eds.), *National-Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics* London, New York: Routledge, 2005: 109-110.

²²See: Barbieri, *op cit*, 13.

²³ Ibid, 6.

²⁴ See: Младеновски, *op cit.*, 223.

²⁵ Barbieri, *op cit*, 3.

exclusive control in cultural matters and educational activities in their respective communities.²⁶ As Akif Aydın noted, Non-Muslims living on Ottoman lands could have gotten education regarding their history, culture and religious beliefs for their children within their millets.²⁷ Thus, the Christian population has preserved its identity and culture, the memory of its glorious past which altogether will later contribute to the cause of national awakening.²⁸ Also, “the Non-Muslim educational institutions had an autonomous status and they continued their educational activities out of state control until recently.”²⁹

Millets within the Ottoman Empire produced the effect of the nation's borders to match, often times, the boundaries of the territory. The non-territorial character of national - cultural autonomy, as was the case with the Ottoman Empire, is embedded in the definition of the nation, of which Renar spoke³⁰ as a "cultural community" of individuals who stand in contraposition to the state.³¹ Thus, “the millets were transformed into secular institutions and in some cases became the nucleus of separate states.”³² This is due to the fact that it is through the educational system, which was largely controlled by religious leaders, that nationalist ideas of the West had penetrated.³³

Thus, the Millet System produced “religious universalism and local parochialism”³⁴ where Barbieri, recalling the image of the well-known Russian Matryoshka Doll, states that „the Ottoman system can be pictured as an institutional – read ‘political’ - framework containing religious, inclusive and a-national units - the Millets - which were themselves divided into ethno-linguistic, exclusive and national groups“.³⁵

However, not all authors share the opinion of Lehmbruch on the Ottoman millet model as a political system with some elements of a consensual political culture, because that society, as Will Kymlicka notes, was neither liberal nor democratic so that it may have any

²⁶ See: Berkes, Niyazi, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, London: Hurst & Company 1998: 108.

²⁷ See; Akif Aydın, M. “Eski Hukukumuzda Gayrimüslimlerin Din ve Vicdan Hürriyeti”, *İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku Araştırmaları* İstanbul 1996: 233.

Bozkurt, Gülnihal, *Alman-İngiliz Belgelerinin ve Siyasi Gelişmelerin Işığında Gayrimüslim Osmanlı Vatandaşlarının Hukuki Durumu*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Publication 1989: 157.

²⁸ See: Младеновски, *op cit.*, 223.

²⁹ Günay, Ramazan “Turkey reason behind Non-muslims allegiance to the Ottoman State” in *Turkish Studies - International Periodical For The Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic Volume 7/4*, Ankara Fall 2012: 1887.

³⁰ Renner, Karl, “State and Nation”, in E. Nimni, *National Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics*, London; NewYork: Routledge, c2005: 38-39.

³¹ See: Barbieri, *op cit.*, 9.

³² Yapp, M. E. *The Making of the Modern Near East, 1792–1923*, New York: Longman, 1987:10.

³³ See: Младеновски, *op cit.*, 223.

³⁴ Kaplat, K.H “Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era”, in. B. Braude and B. Lewis, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The Functioning of a Plural Society*, London: Holmes and Meier Publisher, 1982: 147

³⁵ Barbieri, *op cit.*, 2-3.

democratic political culture derived from it.³⁶ “The Millet System was actually a federation of theocracy. It was a deeply conservative and patriarchal society, diametrically opposite to the ideals of personal freedom, which were advocated even back then by liberals like Locke, Kant and Mill.”³⁷

However, we cannot ignore the fact that the elements of autonomy of the segments in the Ottoman Empire, which primarily had a cultural, non-territorial character, and involvement of the Heads of the Millets in the bureaucratic apparatus of the Empire can be categorized in the group of political arrangements that would be in line with some consociational predecessor.

The political system of both Yugoslavias, the Royal and the Socialist, as a source of consensual political culture

In 1918, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Vardar part of Macedonia will become a part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which according to Joseph Marco was a strong centralized state.

Furthermore, the Vidovdan Constitution of 1921, which drew on Yugoslavianism as the integrating ideology, assumed that there was one nation consisting of three “tribes” – the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – and one language. On the basis of this conception of a national state, Articles 7 to 10 of the St Germain Peace Treaty with the Serb-Croat-Slovene state consequently made it easier for Serbian-Croat-Slovene nationals who belonged to an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority to use their mother tongue in court, laid down safeguards protecting the use of their mother tongue in the educational system and forbade discrimination against them. Article 10 in particular provided that the Muslims as a “religious minority” should enjoy cultural autonomy, officially authorised the application of the sharia and placed mosques, cemeteries and other Islamic religious institutions under government protection.³⁸

However, in such a constellation the Macedonian, Montenegrin and Bosniak ethnicity were not recognized.

This is best seen in the administrative reforms from 3rd of October, 1929, when the Kingdom of SCS was renamed into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, with the aim that the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes would melt into a single Yugoslav nation, and that the administrative

³⁶ See: Кимлика, Вил, *Мултикултурно граѓанство* Скопје: ИДЦИО, 2004: 253.

³⁷ Ibid, 254.

³⁸ Marko, Joseph. “Bosnia and Herzegovina – Multi-Ethnic or Multinational?” In *Societies in Conflict: The contribution of law and democracy to conflict resolution*; Strasbourg: Council of Europe (2000): 99.

reform and the establishment of regional units, which were named after the most famous rivers were supposed to terminate the appointments earlier in the territories through which they passed, to prevent overlap of ethnic and territorial boundaries in order to blur the boundaries between them and prevent disintegrative processes in state.³⁹

With the introduction of regional units a greater autonomy of the nine administrative-territorial units was not granted because the Ban was elected by a royal decree, and the Ban Councils were elected and changed according to the proposal of the Ban, with confirmation of such composition proposed by Minister of Interior of the Kingdom.⁴⁰

Therefore, some authors as Florian Bieber consider that the first Yugoslavia had collapsed precisely as a result of a centralized majoritarian system that neglected different identities and political projects.⁴¹

Socialist Yugoslavia, according to the same author, “began as a Soviet-style federal system that was a mere façade behind which a centralized and authoritarian communist party ruled“. However, as he mentions, “it would be misleading to consider the Yugoslav arrangement a full consociational system, as it lacked democratic elections and other features of Democracy“.⁴²

On the other side, Ivo Banac, deemed that consociationalism was appropriate for the first Yugoslavia, while the second Yugoslavia had come to closely resemble a soft authoritarian consociation because the republican Leagues of Communists were largely autonomous in the field of economic affairs, ideological rigidity, and the future of the political system.⁴³

Other authors from post Yugoslavian regions such as Džaja⁴⁴ also hold the view that the principles of proportional representation, the so-called "national key" and quotas that determine the representation of nations and nationalities in the supranational institutions of Yugoslavia were in line with the typical consociational solutions. This suggests that Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Macedonia as constituent subjectivities of the Yugoslav

³⁹ See: Павловић, Марко, “Југословенска краљевина прва европска регионална држава” *Зборник Матице српске за друштвене науке* (Нови Сад: Матица српска) 2012: 503-521.

⁴⁰ Ibid.,

⁴¹ See: Bieber, *op cit.*, 129.

⁴² Bieber, *op cit.*, 129-130.

⁴³ See: Banac, Ivo, *The National Question of Yugoslavia*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984.

⁴⁴ See: Džaja, Srećko M., *Konfesionalnost i nacionalnost Bosne i Hercegovine. Predemancipacijsko razdoblje 1463.-1804.* Mostar: Ziral, 1984.

Džaja, Srećko M., *Bosna i Hercegovina u austrougarskom razdoblju (1978- 1918).* Mostar: Ziral, 2002.

Džaja, Srećko M., *Politička realnost jugoslavenstva 1918-1991. S posebnim osvrtom na Bosnu i Hercegovinu.* Sarajevo/Zagreb: Svjetlo riječi, 2004.

Federation, acquired, in their political system, some political experience and culture which can be characterized as pre consociational.

From the 1950s onward, “in Yugoslavia, this led to the aforementioned federal system that was supplemented with far-reaching minority rights. Although nationalism that did not fit the dominant ideological pattern was repressed, national identity was not just accepted - it was legitimized under the socialist system“.⁴⁵

In the socialist political creation, as some authors noted, there was a practice of a kind of cultural constitutional pluralism, which had an ambition to rebuild a new Yugoslav Cultural Complex⁴⁶; through what Wallerstein labelled as the „Request for assimilation into the universal“.⁴⁷ Mladenovski also notes that “in the period of the 1970s there was a manifestation of a desire to create an inclusive socialist identity that would transcend traditional ethnic identities“.⁴⁸

On the other hand, neither the Royal, nor the Socialist Federal Yugoslavia, can be experienced as a political system, out of which a democratic political culture and experience, would arise, regardless of the fact that the Yugoslav state was and still is perceived by some theorists of the consociational concept as multicultural and federal state with a mid-level pluralism, and that consociational elements are observed in its constitution array. This tends to support the contention of Rupert Emerson that one party (monistic) system or some other undemocratic regime has obvious advantages in plural societies in which unity is the first requirement.⁴⁹

In such a constellation, “Yugoslavia as a system of power sharing, without a consensus on the political system, was a fragile arrangement, and once elections were held in the republics (never at the federal level) in 1990, the federation failed to move toward a consensus-based consociation and instead dissolved“⁵⁰.

This “moving from the particular” and “re-finding the differences”⁵¹ according to Mladenovski proved one more the “complex and contradictory development of the Yugoslav Federation and its constituent parts.”⁵²

⁴⁵ Bieber, *op cit*, 131.

⁴⁶ See: Младеновски, *op cit.*, 222.

⁴⁷ See: Wallerstein, Immanuel, *The Politics of World – Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

⁴⁸ See: Младеновски, *op cit.*, 223.

⁴⁹ See: Emerson, Rupert, “National-building in Africa” in *Deutsch and Folz* 1963, 95-116.

⁵⁰ Bieber, *op cit.*, 130.

⁵¹ See in Wallerstein, *op cit.*,

⁵² Младеновски, *op cit.*, 224.

CONCLUSION

From the above analysis of the political system of the Ottoman Empire and Yugoslavia it can be concluded that these historical creations, the Bosnian and the Macedonian multi-ethnic and multi-confessional societies being their integral part, faced some type of political culture of peaceful coexistence, tolerance, managing multicultural diversity, which was in line with their pre-consociational experience.

Such pre-consociational experience was valuable for both societies, which, in late 90's of XX century, and at beginning of the XXI century, were involved in a bloody war (B&H) and armed conflict (RM), thus having the need to resolve it in a manner acceptable for a democratic society. The consociational arrangements, also established theoretical concept of the 60's of the XX century, through constitutional and consociational engineering empirically applied, both two post-conflict societies being resolved with the Dayton Peace Accords (1995) and OFA (2001), respectively.

The pre-consociational experience of these two societies, back when they were part of the Ottoman Empire, were seen through the prism of the Millet System, which anticipated the principle of non-territorial autonomy of the segments in the sphere of religion, and education, which was usually organized under 'umbrella' of religious organizations. Through the Millet System as a feature component of socio-political organization of the Ottoman Empire, the cultural diversity within the Empire was maintained and cultivated.

The pre-consociational experience of B&H and Macedonia, in Royal Yugoslavia, was modest, notwithstanding the fact that some authors (Banac) consider that consociational arrangements were coherent for this historical creation. During its existence the Bosniak, and the Macedonian ethnicity were not acknowledged, regardless of the fact that Bosniaks as believers of Islam were guaranteed freedom of religion. Thus, the political system of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, launched the idea of "Yugoslavianism" as a field for experimentation, but also as a rising supranational identity that was supposed to transcend traditional ethnic identities, and the majority of them (Bosniak, Montenegrin, Macedonian) were extremely neglected.

On the other hand, Socialist Yugoslavia, can also be qualified as a state that practiced certain consociational arrangements⁵³, such as the principles of proportionality (as a procedural mechanism), "national key" quotas for adequate representation in the institutions.

⁵³ Although some authors such as Banac noted that "the country was entirely unprepared for evolving into consociationalism." See: Banac, *op cit*, 414.

However, ultimately it is the political system, as pointed out above, that was a soft-authoritarian consociativism.

As much as it is proposed that all these political systems are the fountainhead of some consensual political culture, it should be noted that we are talking about political systems that were essentially neither liberal, nor democratic, because they lacked real democratic institutions, and other attributes of democracy.

Thus, this experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, with the consociational mechanisms in Ottoman period and in both Yugoslavias, could not be considered “as a genuinely enduring, coherent and conscious tradition of democratic consociationalism”.⁵⁴

Therefore they can only partially be recognized as political systems that developed some consociational arrangements, which can be classified as predecessor of consociation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia.

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⁵⁴ Kasapović, *op cit.*, 2005: 8.

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