

Candidat Selection and MPs Behavior Under Mixed Member Electoral Systems in Crossnational Analysis

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to determine how electoral design can influence the behavior of politicians in Parliament in countries that use the mixed electoral system. Through a comparative analysis of most paradigmatic examples of countries that use this model we will attempt to show whether the claim, that MPs elected in SMDs are likely to vote against their parties than those elected by proportion, is correct. This analysis will take into consideration the manner of selection of candidates, since the theory of electoral systems suggests that the behavior of MPs is conditioned not only by the electoral rules, but also by the structure of the selection of candidates. Special emphasis will be given to the Macedonian experience using the mixed model from 1998-2002 and the effects it produced on the selection of candidates and the cohesion of parliamentary groups, and comparing these effects with those produced when the pure majority model in Macedonia was applied (up to 1998) and when the pure proportional model was introduced back in 2002.

Key words: mixed electoral systems, selection of candidates, MPs, party discipline, party selectors;

INTRODUCTION

In political science, there is an increasing interest in the reliable data on the designed electoral system and how it can affect the selection of candidates, and consequently, in what manner does the selection and election of candidates affect their behavior in Parliament.

The well-known position of the electoral science is that through the "closed" list and the models of proportional representation (PR) politicians are greatly depended on the performance of their Party as a whole, as opposed to electoral models with an "open list" or those held in single member districts (SMD), where the politicians can potentially cater to specific interests of their constituents and to break up with the positions of their parties and their party line.²

The mixed member electoral systems are most suitable for investigating the effects that can be produced by the electoral model over the selections of candidates and their behavior in Parliament, because this model unites elements of the proportional list and elections of the candidates in SMD.

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² See: Jun, Hae-Won and Simon Hix, 'Electoral Systems, Political Career Paths and Legislative Behavior: Evidence from South Korea's Mixed-Member System', *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 11 (2), 2010: 153-154.

Existing researches on the behavior of MPs in mixed member systems tend to verify the following assumptions: the elected politicians in SMDs can vote more against their parliamentary party than those elected through a party lists.³

In the theory of the electoral systems the individual parliamentary behavior of MPs should be considered in three contexts - the election rules, the candidate selection in political parties and the career paths of politicians.⁴

In this paper, in part 1, the literature on mixed-member electoral systems has been reviewed, as well as a definition of what the terms party unity / cohesion / discipline (which is determined by the MPs behaviour in Parliament) mean, and how the electoral system, and the selection of candidates can affect MP's behaviour in the Parliament. Part 2 considers the specific characteristics of elections and candidate selection in several countries that use the mixed member electoral model and proposes several hypotheses on how the expected processes affect the legislative behaviour in those countries. In part 3 gives an analyses on the Macedonian experience under the mixed member system from 1998 to 2002.

1. Theoretical Background

1.1 Defining the mixed electoral system

Mixed electoral systems, by definition, involve the mixture of election rules in a single election context. "Extant definitions of mixed systems vary in their precise delineation of the combinations of election rules that qualify as *mixed*".⁵

"Mixed systems combine at least two types of election rules into a single contest, the nature of that combination may vary".⁶ Usually, mixed electoral systems are ones in which part of the mandates are allocated according to the majority, and the rest according to proportionality. A true mixed effect will be achieved when the electoral system will trigger the mandates given by the proportionality to compensate for the disproportion that is produced by the mandates awarded in SMDs. The effect of this model will be parallel if the seats allocated according to the proportionality do not correct the disproportionality occurred in the SMDs.⁷

The distinction on mixed and parallel electoral models has been delineated by Reynolds and Reilly, however, other authors, such as Massicotte and Blais, distinguish mixed models with corrective, superposition, supper mixed and coexistence dimension, and Shugart and

³ See: Hae-Won and Hix, *op.cit*, 154.

⁴ See: *Ibid.*,

⁵ Johnson, Paul E. and Erik S. Herron, 'Assessing Variation in Mixed Electoral Rules Using Agent-Based Models', Paper prepared for presentation at the *Midwest Political Science Association Conference*, Chicago Illinois, April, 2005: 1.

⁶ *Ibid*, p 2.

⁷ See: Климовски и Каракамишева, *Политички партии и интересни групи*. Штип: 2-ри Август, 2006: 265.

Wattenberg distinguish between mixed electoral systems in which the majoritarian or the proportional effect prevails.⁸

1.2 The concept of party unity, party cohesion, party discipline

The use of terms such as party unity, party cohesion and party discipline in electoral science is often confusing and overlapping. According to Sieberer, “the terms ‘unity’, ‘cohesion’ and ‘discipline’ are often used interchangeably”.⁹ Jenkins said that if all three terms are taken into consideration, then they mean exactly the same thing: “the average percent of partisans who voted with the party line, on party votes during a given session.”¹⁰

In the studies of Heler and Mershon there is a brief mention that both party discipline and party cohesion are observations of party unity.¹¹ For Malloy both discipline and cohesion are “overlapping routes to party unity.”¹² Unity, according to Sieberer can be brought about via two analytically distinct paths:

First, it can be caused by shared preferences; this is referred to as ‘cohesion’. Second, unity can result from sanctions or positive incentives that make members vote together even though their preferences differ; this is referred to as ‘discipline’.¹³

But some authors make a clear distinction between party cohesion and party discipline and talk about these two concepts as if they were talking about different things.¹⁴ Out of the aforementioned definitions it can be found that cohesion has been used in relation to the

⁸ For more, see: Reynolds, Andrew and B. Reilly, *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*, Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1997; Massicotte, Louis and Andre Blais, ‘Mixed Electoral Systems: A Conceptual and Empirical Survey’, in *Electoral Studies* 18, 1999: 344-366; Shugart, Matthew S. and Martin P. Wattenberg, ‘Are Mixed-Member Systems the Best of Both Worlds?’, in M.S Shugart and M.P. Wattenberg, (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001;

⁹ Sieberer, Ulrich, ‘Party Unity in Parliamentary Democracies: A Comparative Analysis’ *The Journal of Legislative Studies*; 12 (2006), 2: 151.

¹⁰ Jenkins, Shannon, ‘Party Voting in US State Legislature’, Paper presented at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, August 30-September 2, 2001: 9.

¹¹ See: Heller, William B. and Carol Mershon, ‘Fluidity in Parliamentary Parties: Exits and Entries in Parliamentary Groups in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1996-2000’, Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 30-September 3, 2000: 3.

¹² Malloy, Jonathan ‘High Discipline, Low Cohesion? The Uncertain Patterns of Canadian Parliamentary Party Groups’, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 2003: 1.

¹³ Sieberer, *op.cit.*, pg. 151.

¹⁴ See: Bowler, Shaun, David M. Farrell and Richard Katz, (eds.), *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*, Columbus Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1999.

preferences of MPs, whereas discipline has been used to denote the uniformity of MPs voting in Parliament.

The discipline in Parliament can be also trained by the use of the carrot and the stick in order to maintain the unified vote inside Parliament.¹⁵ On the other hand, party groups in Parliament are cohesive when they are “made up of like-minded people who vote together because they share preferences.”¹⁶ But despite these differences, both concepts are still often used in correlation with party unity.

1.3 The impact of the electoral system on the candidate selections and MP behaviour

A certain group of authors argues that that electoral systems and intra-party candidate selection procedures are two distinct separate institutions that might induce contradictory incentives for legislator's behavior.¹⁷

John Carrey and Matthew Shugart say that ‘candidate-centric’ electoral rules, such as an open-list PR system, encourage more independent politicians, who do not follow the official party line, than politicians who are elected under ‘party-centric’ rules, such as closed-list PR system.¹⁸

Some authors in the science of electoral systems take the position that:

under restrictive electoral systems that encourage party-centered behavior (e.g. Closed PR systems), and hence produce unified, disciplined parties, the influence of candidate selection procedures on legislators' behavior should be minimal, since the electoral system already ensures a high degree of discipline. On the other hand, where the electoral system is permissive and encourages

¹⁵See: Linek, Lukáš and Petra Rakušanová, ‘Parties in the Parliament. Why, When and How do Parties Act in Unity? Parliamentary Party Groups in the Chamber of Deputies in the years 1998-2002’, in *Sociological Papers*, Prague: Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, 2002:9.

¹⁶Heller and Mershon, *op.cit.*, p.3

¹⁷ See: Shomer, Yael, ‘Electoral Systems and Intra-Party Candidate Selection Effects on Legislators’ Behavior. Paper presented at the *Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*, Toronto, Canada, 3-6 September 2009: 3.

¹⁸ For more, see Shugart, Matthew S., ‘Comparative Electoral Systems Research’, Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005; Shugart, Mathew S., Melody E. Valdini, and Kati Suominen, ‘Looking for Locals: Voter Information Demands and Personal Vote-Earning Attributes of Legislators Under Proportional Representation’, *American Journal of Political Science* 49, 2005: 437–49; Carey, John M., ‘Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting’, *American Journal of Political Science*, 51, 2007: 92–107; Carey, John M., *Legislative Voting and Accountability*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008; Carey, John M. and Matthew S. Shugar, ‘Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas’, *Electoral Studies* 14, 1995: 417–39; Carey, John M., *Legislative Voting and Accountability*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

personal-vote seeking behavior, if legislators are selected via restrictive procedures they will be induced to behave in a party centered manner.¹⁹

According Richard Katz, the electoral formula, the district magnitude, and the ballot structure are related to party unity.²⁰ Under mixed member electoral model this claim means that the proportional list (PR) can potentially be a generator for more cohesive and disciplined parties than single member district systems (SMDs), because MPs elected in SMDs (with majority-runoff or first past the post method) are expected to be less responsive to the party central.

Hazan and Rahat, claim that if the process of candidat selection is more de-centralized, then the incentives for legislators to emphasize their personal reputations and break their party's line will be the greater.²¹

Other authors, however, say that "whereas electoral systems and candidate selection processes are two distinct institutions with separate effects, legislators are influences concurrently by both".²² Thus, "the Electoral systems and candidate selection processes remain substitutive tools with which party leaders may induce discipline".²³

On the other hand, the mixed electoral systems are very suitable for the analysis of these effects, because they unite elements of voting for a proportional list, and elements of personal voting in single member constituencies.

Therefore, due to these circumstances, in the mixed electoral systems the selection of candidates will be important because of the differences in behavior that can arise between MPs elected by proportional representation and those elected by majority voting.

"In sum, the effect of electoral rules on legislative behavior is clearer to identify in a study of a single country with a mixed-member system, where politicians from the same party are elected under different electoral rules".²⁴

2. The hypothetical effects of mixed electoral model over the candidate section and MPs behaviour in cross national analyse

This paper shall analyze party unity (discipline, cohesion) in representative bodies in some of the countries that use the mixed electoral system.

In the science of electoral systems the hypothetical expectations of party unity are brought to correlate with the process of selection of

¹⁹ Shomer, Yael, *op.cit.*, p. 4- 5.

²⁰ See: Katz, Richard S. *A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems*, Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1980;

²¹ See: Rahat, Gideon and Reuven Y. Hazan., 'Candidate Selection methods: an Analytical Framework', in *Party Politics* 7: 2001: 297–322.

²² Shomer, Yael, *op.cit.*, p.4.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Hae-Won and Hix, *op.cit.*, 157.

candidates²⁵, and the nature of the electoral system under which they are elected. On this basis, we can develop assumptions about the expected behavior of the MPs.

There are few hypothetical assumptions that can be produced by the mixed electoral system over the selection of candidates and party discipline / cohesion / unity of elected parliamentarians:

- *The MPs elected in SMDs are expected to be a more responsive to the interest of their voters in the electoral district and is to be expected to show a low level of party discipline.*

- *The MPs elected in a proportional representation system, especially with closed-list, party selectors can exercise a strong control over them probability of gaining re-election (or re-nomination). Therefore, the MPs elected and selected under such circumstances, face incentives to adhere to party leaders' wishes and maintain a cohesiveness of the party group.*

- *On the effect of selection processes it can be noted that if the selection process is more permissive and more democratized, then the less discipline will be the parliamentary group or vice versa.*

These hypothetical effects, which can be produced by the mixed electoral system during the selection of candidates and its elections, if they are examined in most paradigmatically examples of countries who use this electoral system, can lead to different conclusions.

The electoral model of **Germany**²⁶ is among the most typical examples that reconfirms the aforementioned hypothetical effects that can cause a mixed electoral system in terms of creating lists (candidate selection) and party cohesion in Parliament. This model, remains to be perceived as a proportional system with mixed membership,²⁷ and as Shugart and Wattenberg noted that this model became influential in the planning of post-communist and post-authoritarian electoral systems and reforms of the existing election systems in mature liberal democracies.²⁸

The electoral law of the Federal Republic supports the decentralized organization of the major political parties in Germany.²⁹

²⁵ In this paper, the selection of the candidates will be reviewed in a context of the internal competition in the party and how it can be considered as one of the tools through which party leaders and selectors "train" discipline.

²⁶ In the Federal Diet (Bundestag), 299 members are elected by plurality vote in single-member constituencies to serve 4-year terms and 299 members are allocated by popular vote through a mixed member proportional system to serve 4-year terms. For more see: IFES Election Guide, Election for Bundestag (Federal Diet) 2013.

²⁷ See: Farrell, D.M., *Comparing Electoral Systems*. Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hill, 1997: 87; also Scarrow, S.E., 'Germany: The Mixed-Member System as a Political Compromise', in M.S. Schugart and M.P. Wattenberg (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?* Oxford University Press, 2001: 55.

²⁸ Shugart, Matthew S. and Martin P. Wattenberg, 'Are Mixed-Member Systems the Best of Both Worlds?', in M.S. Shugart and M.P. Wattenberg, (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001;

²⁹ Scarrow, S.E., 'Germany: The Mixed-Member System as a Political Compromise', in M.S. Schugart and M.P. Wattenberg (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?* Oxford University Press, 2001: 64.

The selection of candidates³⁰ by electoral districts is controlled by local party organizations. Regional party lists are composed of state delegate's conference of party organizations at regional state.³¹

According to Saalfeld, the MPs who have been directly elected in SMDs were significantly more influential than their counterparts elected by party list and stressed that their decisions should be based on their judgment and they want to represent all the citizens of their local constituency.³² This means that, "the mandate affects the MPs orientation in Parliament".³³

In the Bundestag (Germania's lower house of the Parliament) there is a tendency that the MPs elected in SMDs tend to join committees that mainly serve geographic interests, whereas members elected on party lists tend to join committees that mainly serve general public interests.³⁴

But in **Hungary's** mixed electoral system³⁵, according to Benoa, yet those who were elected in SMDs, did not showed greater individuality and initiative than their counterparts in Germany. The reason may be located in another dimension of the model.

Hungarian party discipline, according the same author, is pretty strong:

encouraged by the constant threat of withdrawal of party support during the next election. Not only is the

³⁰ For more see: Section 21 Nomination of Party Candidates, Federal Elections Act.

³¹ Klingemann, H-D and Wessles, B., 'The Political Consequence of Germany's Mixed-Member System: Personalization at the Grasse Root', in .S. Schugart and M.P. Wattenberg (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Bothe Worlds?* Oxford University Press, 2001: 288-289.

³² See: Салфелд, Томас 'Германија Стабилност и стратегија во пропорционалниот систем со мешано членство', во М. Галагер и П. Мичел (ед.), *Политика на изборните системи*, Скопје: Академски печат, 2009: 238-239.

³³ Klingemann, H-D and Wessles, B., *op.cit.*

³⁴ Stratmann, Thomas and Martin Baur, 'Plurality Rule, Proportional Representation, and the German Bundestag: How Incentives to Pork-Barrel Differ across Electoral Systems', *American Journal of Political Science*, 46: 2001: 506-14.

³⁵ In the National Assembly (*Országgyűlés*), 106 members are elected in single-member constituencies to serve 4-year terms and 93 members are elected through a national-list proportional representation system to serve 4-year terms. Every voter with a registered address in Hungary may cast two votes: one for a candidate in the voter's single-member district and one for a national list (party list or ethnic minority list). As per the electoral law passed in 2011, single-member district elections will now take place in only one round and will be determined by first-past-the-post plurality vote. The previous turnout requirements have been abolished. Votes for party lists contribute to the election of members by proportional representation. The threshold in this tier is 5 percent nationwide (10 percent for two-party lists and 15 percent for lists with 3 or more parties). Votes for non-winning candidates are added to that candidate's party list's votes, as are all votes for winning candidates which exceed the number needed to win that constituency.

See: IFES Election Guide, Election for Országgyűlés / National Assembly 2014.

organization of SMD candidacies and signature collection in practice led through party effort³⁶, but also the parties determine the composition of lists in advance and in private. The result is not only a political competition that is heavily, almost exclusively, centred around parties, but also a highly centralized party system where leaders exercise strong, top-down control.³⁷

The Hungarian electoral law,³⁸ gives to the Hungarian parties chance to place their leaders and other members whose election they consider most crucial at the top of their national lists, as well as placing that candidate for election in a SMD, practice that is often criticized in Hungary because they place a great deal of power in the hands of parties and party leaders.³⁹

That mixed electoral system, that can generate a differentiation between MPs, those elected by majority and proportional model, and consequently to speak for members from the "first" and "second" line, is the Japanese electoral system. “**Japan** is the only democracy that does not print its ballots.”⁴⁰

In this country, according Reed, politicians constantly mention how good the feeling is to know that tens of thousands of people have written their name. This is also part of the reason why Diet members elected from multi-member districts feel as second class members of the Diet – nobody wrote their names on the ballot.⁴¹ The electoral rules in Japan permit candidates to run simultaneously in SMDs and proportional list.⁴²

“The parties rarely make systematical difference between the candidates elected in SMDs and in multi-member districts, so those who are competing in the two layers trully resemble each other.”⁴³ Still, certain differentiations of elected representatives in the Diet already exist.⁴⁴

³⁶Nomination in any single-member constituency shall be subject to a minimum of five hundred recommendations signed by voting citizens. See **Section 6 (1)** from Act CCIII of 2011 On the Elections of Members of Hungarian Parliament.

³⁷ Benoit, *op.cit.*, p.246.

³⁸ Party list may be drawn up by any political party which nominated candidates independently in at least twenty-seven single-member constituencies within at least nine counties and in Budapest. A person nominated by any political party in any single-member constituency may only appear on the party list of the same political party. See **Section 8 (1)** and **Section 10 (2)** from Act CCIII of 2011 On the Elections of Members of Hungarian Parliament.

³⁹ See: Benoit, *op.cit.*, p.247.

⁴⁰ Рид, Стивен, Р., ‘Јапонија: Неодлучно кон двопартиски ситем’, во М. Галагер и П. Мичел (ед.), *Политика на изборните системи*, Скопје: Академски печат, 2009: 302.

⁴¹ Ibid.,

⁴² However, candidates are only allowed to run in the proportional representation block in which their single-seat constituency is located. See: IFES Election Guide, Election for Japanese House of Representatives, 2012.

⁴³ Рид, *op.cit.*, 311.

⁴⁴ In Japan’s Diet there are few types of MPs based on the way in which they are elected. One of them is notable as “zombie” – those who are elected in SMD and those who ran only on PR lists. The second type is the so-called “raised

However, the new electoral system of Japan,⁴⁵ unlike the former model of the single non-transferable vote, which according to Gallagher allowed candidates from political parties to be openly hostile to each other, now with the electoral reform advocates for individual support, but at the same time trying to act as team.⁴⁶

Pekkanen and others believe that the reason for the increase in cohesiveness of Japanese parliamentary groups lies in the new electoral system, “that Japanese Diet members in vulnerable positions either on the party lists or in marginal SMDs are given high profile legislative posts to increase their chances of re-election”.⁴⁷ Thus, reelections are possible only if they are loyal and disciplined.

The mixed electoral system in **New Zealand**⁴⁸ also, something like the Japanese and the German ones, generate specific differentiation of MPs depending on how they are elected - with plural vote or on the proportional list. Vowles states that those who are elected in multi-member districts are potentially more responsive to their party organizations that select and rank them, but have also neutralized the impact of party parliamentary leadership on backbench members of Parliament, thereby improving intra party democracy.⁴⁹

MPs elected in SMDs in New Zealand usually provide services to their electoral districts and are given more resources than the members of pluri-nominal constituencies. While the MPs elected in SMDs are

from the dead” candidate - there are MPs who are losing SMD candidates but are still elected on their party’s PR list. For more, see Pekkanen, Robert, Benjamin Nyblade, and Ellis S. Krauss, ‘Electoral Incentives in Mixed Member Systems: Party, Posts, and Zombie Politicians in Japan’, *American Political Science Review*, 100: 2006: 185.

⁴⁵Under the new system, in the House of Representatives (the most important chamber of the Diet) 300 seats are allocated in SMDs, and 180 in 11 multi-member districts where 6 to 29 mandates are redistributed, unlike the old model of SNTV, applied in small plurinominal districts with an average of 3-5 candidates elected, but voters could express only one preference. See: Рид, *op.cit.*, p. 299-302. In accordance with the amendments to the Electoral law adopted by the House of Representatives on 25 June 2013, which came into effect on 28 July 2013, the number of single-member constituencies will be reduced from 300 to 295 starting from the next general elections, due by December 2016, which will then elect a 475-member House of Representatives. See: JAPAN Shugiin (House of Representatives), ELECTORAL SYSTEM, <http://www.ipu.org/>.

⁴⁶See in: Галагер, Мајкл, ‘Ирска: Дискретниот шарм на поединечниот пренослив глас’, во М. Галагер и П. Мичел (ед.), *Политика на изборните системи*, Скопје: Академски печат, 2009: 553.

⁴⁷ Pekkanen, Nyblade, and Krauss, *op.cit.*, 2006: 183–93.

⁴⁸In the House of Representatives, in 2011, 70 members were elected by plurality vote in single-member constituencies to serve 3-year terms and 50 members were elected through a closed-list proportional representation system to serve 3-year terms. A referendum on the voting system was held in conjunction with the 2011 election, with 57.8% of voters voting to keep the existing Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) voting system.

See: IFES Election Guide, Election for House of Representatives of New Zealand 2011.

⁴⁹ Ваулес, Џек, ‘Нов Зеланд: Консолидација на реформата?’, во М. Галагер и П. Мичел (ед.), *Политика на изборните системи*, Скопје: Академски печат, 2009: 326.

more focused on their constituency, the MPs elected in pluri-nominal districts are more focused on the work in Parliament.⁵⁰

The case of **South Korea** is a complete opposite of the presumed expectations of parliamentary behavior and brought in mixed electoral systems. According to Won Jun and Hix, KNA members in SMDs are more loyal than members from party lists.

This behavior stems from the particular structure of candidate selection and politicians' career paths in South Korea. Specifically, after the introduction of a two-ballot system in 2004, Korean parties had an incentive to use the national party lists to show-case high profile figures who only expect to be in the KNA for a single term. In contrast, the members elected in the SMDs in the parties' regional heartlands tended to be senior party barons who set the policy positions of the parties.⁵¹

In South Korea unlike the other countries that have a mixed member system, candidates in SMDs cannot be nominated in the PR lists.⁵²

There are two types of MPs in the Korean national Assembly.⁵³ Those that are elected from the PR list, in most of the cases newcomers in politics, and they are recruited by the party's selectors either because of their political expertise, or because they are supported from professional or interest groups, or because their position on the parties lists are current for the party. These newcomers in Korean politics use their mandate in KNA tending to build strong national profile in order to make themselves attractive for a competitive SMD seat for next elections. The other types of candidates elected from the PR list are high-profile figures (in most of cases former ministers, political advisors, experts with an academic, business or bureaucratic background) who do not intend to have a career in Korean Parliament beyond a single term because they are too old, however their presence on the party list is

⁵⁰ See: Ваулес, *op. cit.* 327.

⁵¹ Hae-Won and Simon Hix, *op.cit.* 154.

⁵² In most of the mixed system, candidates are allowed to compete on both the level of the SMDs and on the level of the PR lists. But when dual-candidacy does not exist, the candidates can tend to be promoted from marginal positions on one level to safe positions on the other level. Also, a party can make a tactical move to nominate a high-profile political figure in a SMD where the party certainly has no chance of winning a mandate in order to encourage its supporters to cast their vote for the party's PR list. For more, see: Cox, Karen and Len Schoppa, 'Interaction Effects and Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: Theory and Evidence from Germany, Japan, and Italy', *Comparative Political Studies* 35, 2002: 1027–53; Herron, Erik S. and Misa Nishikawa, 'Contamination Effects and the Number of Parties in Mixed- Superposition Electoral Systems', *Electoral Studies* 20, 2001: 63–86.

⁵³ In the National Assembly (*Kukhoe*), 245 members are elected by plurality vote in single-member constituencies to serve 4-year terms and 54 members are elected through a closed-list proportional representation system to serve 4-year terms. In order to gain representation in the ordinal tier, parties must obtain either three percent of the national vote or at least five seats in the nominal tier. See: IFES Election Guide, Election for Kuk Hoe / National Assembly 2012.

welcomed for the parties because it raises the profile of the party in a national campaign.⁵⁴

According to the same authors, more consideration is taken into account in the selection of candidates in SMDs. The local parties committee could recommend more than one candidate for an SMD. When the committee recommends one candidate for a SMD, the party leadership could veto him or her. When the committee recommends more than one candidate, the parties usually conduct a local primary. The primaries were open to non-party members.⁵⁵

3. Macedonia's experience with the mixed member model 1998-2002

Reynolds and Reilly, have qualified the Macedonian mixed electoral system as a model in which the Two round system (or majority-runoff) prevails; for Massicotte and Blais it was a superposition system, whereas for Shugart and Wattenberg it was a mixed model with a predominantly majority component.⁵⁶

Election of Members according to the majority principle (in 85 SMDs) was standardized in the same way as the old electoral law.⁵⁷

A novelty in this sense was the 35 seats allocated according to proportion. The voter voted for closed party lists without the ability to change the order of candidates determined by the party's selectors.

Fixed list disabled the voters to intervene in it, and according to Jovevska that was evidence of the high degree of control that the parties leaders had over the ranking of the party colleagues - candidates in the ballots. Party leaders were the ones who controlled the nomination, which meant that the narrow circle of party leadership decided as to which members of the party will be given the honor to become a candidate for election.⁵⁸

Candidate status was conditional with previous party blessing. Party leaders determined the order of the list. Thus, the value or personal reputation of the candidate was minimized. For these candidates, the party's reputation was enough to trump on the list, compared with the candidates that "ran" in SMDs who were forced to self-promote.⁵⁹

However, the introduction of the mixed electoral system, due to the right to cast two votes (for the candidate and for the list), only formally improved the value of the individual vote, because the double vote, according to Klimovski and Karakamisheva did not reduce the contradiction between the powerful party structures and popular

⁵⁴ See: Hae-Won and Hix, *op.cit.*, 158-159.

⁵⁵ See: Hae-Won and Hix, *op.cit.*, 159-60.

⁵⁶ See in Johnson, Paul E. and Erik S. Herron, 'Assessing Variation in Mixed Electoral Rules Using Agent-Based Models', Paper prepared for presentation at the *Midwest Political Science Association Conference*, Chicago Illinois, April, 2005: 15.

⁵⁷ See член 88 стр. 1 од Законот за избор на пратеници во Собранието на Р.М 1998.

⁵⁸ See: Јовевска, Анета *Изборните концепти во теориите на демократијата*, Скопје: Институт за социолошки и политичко- правни истражувања, 1999: 247.

⁵⁹ See: *Ibid.*,

individuals or contradiction between the parties as subjects and candidates as individuals.⁶⁰

Macedonia's experience with the mixed electoral system if it is compared with other established countries that use this system was similar to South Korea, in terms of an explicit ban "to the applicant that cannot list the same candidate on the candidate list and the list of candidates."⁶¹

There were, also, similarities with the Hungarian mixed model, because in Macedonia, the party leaders, too, had been circumventing the immediate test of its popularity. They themselves preferred to be nominated at the proportional list of candidates allowing them, regardless of the election outcome, to enter in Parliament.

As for the cohesion of parliamentary groups, generally, in the Republic of Macedonia, which in its more than two decade democratic experience had tried all three predominant electoral models (majoritarian since 1990 and up to 1998, from 1998 to 2002 the mixed model, and as of 2002 to this day, the proportional model), and they were generally cohesive. The role of party leadership was and remains crucial in the selection of candidates even when the elections were organized in SMDs, when the proportional model was applied and when combinations of both rules were applied (1998-2002). The Macedonian parties in the past more than two decades, neither promote intra party democracy; nor did they took the path towards a more decentralized approach in the selection of candidates, but only enforced the crucial role of party leadership in that selectio. When the mixed model was replaced with purely proportional electoral system in 2002, these tendencies had increased. Some of the political parties in Macedonia even developed such mechanisms for "training" discipline in Parliament which did not to correlate with the electoral system, such as signing promissory notes and their activation in potential transfer as a tool, at all costs, to maintain the discipline in parliamentary group.

CONCLUSION

Electoral systems clearly shape the conduct of MPs inside Parliament vis-à-vis their constituents and their party leaders. However, the way the electoral system is designed and how it affects the behavior of MPs is not as straightforward as some of the theories advocated.⁶²

From the above analysis made on the impact of mixed electoral rules on the behavior of MPs it can be concluded that it is not uniform. It does not show any uniformity on the basis of selection of candidates in the proportional lists or in SMDs districts, which can be used as training mechanisms for the party discipline by the selectors.

According to Gallagher and Mitchell⁶³, the impact of the mixed electoral system on the behavior of MPs is *moderate* in Germany, Hungary, and Japan, with the difference that MPs in Germany elected

⁶⁰ See: Климовски и Каракамишева, *op.cit* 123-124.

⁶¹ See член 35 стр. 1 од Законот за избор на пратеници во Собранието на Р.М 1998.

⁶² See: Hae-Won and Hix, *op.cit*, 169.

⁶³ Галагер, Мајкл и Пол Мичел, *Политика на изборните системи*, Скопје: Академски печат, 2009: 590-592.

SMDs are more focused on electoral district than those elected by regional lists, while in Hungary the party loyalty is strengthened regardless of the districts the elected MPs come from, whereas, in Japan there is a trend to reduce the independence of MPs. In New Zealand the impact of the electoral system on the behavior of MPs is *tricky*.

The same authors, in terms of cohesiveness, believe that the electoral system is a contributing factor to the high cohesion in Hungary and Japan, however, the electoral system is not seen as a factor for greater cohesion in Germany and New Zealand.⁶⁴

In South Korea, the impact of the electoral system on the behavior of MPs is strong, with the difference that members elected by manner of PR are less loyal than those elected in the SMDs. Cohesion of parliamentary groups is provided by more MPs elected in SMDs, unlike those from PR lists, and this correlates with the highly centralized candidate selection systems.⁶⁵

In the Republic of Macedonia, in the period 1998-2002, neither the electoral system was seen as having a crucial impact on the behavior of MPs, nor was the cohesion of parliamentary groups influenced by it. The cohesion was secured and is still secured via a party-centric system of candidate selection.

⁶⁴ See: *Ibid.*,

⁶⁵ See: Hae-Won and Hix, *op.cit.*, 169.

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