Candidat Selection and MPs Behavior Under Mixed Member Electoral Systems in Crossnational Analysis

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to determine how electoral design
can influence the behavior of politicians in Parliament in countries that
use the mixed electoral system. Through a comparative analysis of most
paradigmatic examples of countries that use this model we will attempt
to show whether the claim, that MPs elected in SMDs are likely to vote
against their parties than those elected by proportion, is correct. This
analysis will take into consideration the manner of selection of
candidates, since the theory of electoral systems suggests that the
behavior of MPs is conditioned not only by the electoral rules, but also
by the structure of the selection of candidates. Special emphasis will be
given to the Macedonian experience using the mixed model from 1998-
2002 and the effects it produced on the selection of candidates and the
cohesion of parliamentary groups, and comparing these effects with
those produced when the pure majority model in Macedonia was applied
(up to 1998) and when the pure proportional model was introduced back
in 2002.