THE PRISONER'S CODE AS AN EXCHANGE CAPITAL IN THE FUNSTIONING OF THE CLOSE-TYPE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE IN ZENICA, BIH

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Abstract: An important functioning aspect of the prison community is its social climate, composed by the interdependencies of the subdimensions such as: deprivation, the prison code (informal aspect of the prison), repression and disorganization (the formal aspect of imprisonment) that defines the direction and movement of this community through a complex environment in an effort to explain or use that for its own purpose. The social climate was measured by a custom inventory of attitudes originally created by R.H. Moos in a closed-type prison in Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this paper, we focus on a prison code based on values that the prisoners have in the time-space of the prison. The prison code is a theoretical construct that has its reality in prison experience. In this work, we present the correlation and multiple values of the prison code in relation to other subdimensions of the social climate from 1991, 1993, 1994, 1997 and 2016. In all samples more than 80% of prisoners were included, except for 2016 were approximately 20% of prisoners were included in the sample. All the individual and multiple correlations of the prison code with other subdimensions are statistically significant (I will specifically present them during the presentation) and it seems that has a significant impact on a scenario that takes place in prison; ranging from a riot, to its normal day-to-day functioning.

Keywords: prison community, social climate of prison, informal community, multiple correlations of the prison code, exchange theory

Prison community

A simple, yet very precise definition of a prison is one that defines it as a unique community that is sustained with walls, weapons, rules, and regulations. This definition directly exposes the antagonist nature within that community, the formal and informal aspect of its organisation and its participants.

The formal system is based upon the prison's staff and the normative system (i.e., law on execution of criminal sanctions, detention and other measures, house rules). The purpose of this formal system in a prison is to maintain order, regulate behaviour and intermediate with the outside world. It is comprised of the method of enforcement, formalities, bureaucratic management, routines, and formal authority.

The informal system is based on the prisoners themselves and their interpersonal relationships within a defined and limited habitat. It comprises of informal patterns of behaviour conditioned by their lack of freedom, living and working conditions within the facility, but also of their struggle for status, which in turn produces informal authorities.

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The position of each individual within such a frame of differentiated environment as well as formal and informal parts of prison, constitutes the prison reality, that is, what is called a prison's social climate. Prison, being a man-made product, still carries a surprisingly large number of problems to which every participant and member of formal and informal system has to respond to. The prisoners' problems are those of adjustment to the prison situation, handling the effects of the loss of freedom and the related deficiencies, criminal impact of prison itself, the effect of the prison situation on the personality of the prisoner which is better known as imprisonment of personality. (Clemmer, 1958, p. 111-133).

On top of these issues, others are up for debate - like the ones that concern the relationship of society towards prisons and the upholding the human rights, that is, whether prisons are socially justifiable facilities.

Prison situation, its reality, its social climate, or a number of simultaneous facts make an event that is naturally variable, however, multiple measurements can crystallise the main components or events that compromise a prison situation. (Moos, 1960, 1968, 1974, Brinc, 1985, Ajduković, Kulenović, 1989, Ajduković 1990, Šabani, 2005).

The formal and the informal aspects of prison are by themselves antagonistic, yet these two parts are differentiated within themselves. The formal part is split into staff (educators, guards, administration, medical personnel, instructors, and the warden) and into the normative acts through which they function (house rules policy of the indoor correctional institute in Zenica, European prison policies from 2006, orders, rulebooks, instructions… etc.).

The informal part is compartmentalised based on formal criteria into collectives, work units, students, minors, users of available recreational sports… etc.). In reality, the informal part is split into gamblers, homosexuals, loan-sharks, professional criminals, sniffers… etc.

This complexity of prison goings-on makes its social climate which in turn represents a hypothetical construct. Based on extensive research, personal empirical evidence, and wide-ranging literature we have concluded that the social climate universe unravels itself through repression, deprivation, disorganisation and the prison code. Thus, the prison's social climate is the result of the relations within the time-space categories, which are determined by various levels of repression, prison disorganisation, prisoners' deprivations, and the prison code.

In this kind of approach, repression is measured with the enforcement of power to the relation between formal and informal communities, that is, depending on the level of supervision, control, application of force and so on, regardless of the efficacy of the methods.

Prison disorganisation is measured with the number of riots, insufficiency of clarity and the singularity of the demands and procedures, consistency of treatment, overall system stability within both formal and informal prison wings but also in between them.

Deprivations are measured with the level of removed preferred values (freedom, hedonism, autonomy etc.) which in turn is the result of their mutual operation. Deprivations, although a subjective experience, fluctuate depending on the type of prisoner and their sentence phase.

Prison code is measured with all the unwritten rules of conduct within the prison community, which is based on their special system of values, interpersonal support and the inclusion with the prison community, its homogeneity, its opposition strength, and negotiation ability with the formal community.

In the centre of our interest is the prison code as a subcultural core of the prison community. We also are understanding prison code as an exchange capital. With this in mind, we feel that this theory of exchange, which we will explain briefly, is very important, and we will highlight its key assumptions.

The prison code

In order to soften the deprivation of prison life, a prison community creates relationships within itself, which can ease the blow of one's sentence. Tolerance and solidarity between prisoners are a necessary social construct of the prison conditions. Prisoners tend to create values which could guide them through space-time of a prison. In this way, a measure of behaviour is created, whose value is defined by the prisoners. Prisoner community is dynamic and through its functioning a connection of prison conditions appears – between prisoners' roles, their stratification, hierarchy, and social types. The values of this prison community tend to classify and name all these phenomena and processes. Based on the research (Sykes, 1958, Sykes, Messinger,1962) we can safely claim that the following values appear within a prison community:

- solidarity;
- opposition towards the prison staff;
- prisoners' personality and the preservation of its autonomy;
- order and stability;
- possession of material things and
- connection to the outside world.

Goals are defined by values and the basic values of a prison community emerge from the basic problems which the prisoners face inside of a prison. In order for values to exist in the first place there must be a minimum consent, that is to say, depending on people's desires.

Solidarity or group cohesion within a prison community is the total amount of loyalty, mutual assistance, tolerance, friendship, and support among the prisoners.

However, solidarity is questionable when we are talking about a heterogenic community, such as a prison one, because everyone already feels interconnected. The source of solidarity inside of a prison is the shared circumstance of serving a sentence as the most powerful factor of cohesion, same as the fact that a prisoner needs to answer a question whether his life in prison will be easier if he is interconnected to the prison community.

Gresham Sykes and Sheldon Messinger (1962), based on their research and extensive literature, have categorised the main principles of the prison code as follows:

1. The norm of forbidding the giving of information to the staff, or "snitching". This ban protects the prison community from a reaction of the formal system to prohibited acts which are regulated in the house rules. This norm produces a norm of loyalty and tolerance for a fellow prisoner;
2. The norm of controlling the emotions and conflicts which come out of all this need to be minimal in order not to disturb the balance of the community, that is to say, the minimal conditions of acceptance;

3. The norm of dealing with material possessions – a prisoner is usually expected to share the goods with others (cafeteria deposit, packages and cigarettes for example);

4. The norm of dignity that relates to the ideal type of a prisoner, marked as "the right guy" – and for breaking this norm there is a series of punishments;

5. The norm of repudiation of reputation and respect for the prison staff and the society that they represent. Work ethics that the formal system imposes onto the prison community are, according to the prisoners' observations, not respected by the formal system in the first place. Prisoners see themselves as being exploited, especially the ones that are employed in industrial facilities. It must be acknowledged that a prisoner's criticism is more often accurate and rarely erroneous, possibly because the constant observation of the formal staff. These insights are used whenever the situation demands them and are always aimed at higher cases. A prisoner creates the strategic relationships in the act of criticism (voicing them out during the serving of his sentence, but not at the beginning or near the end of it), plus he or she are interested in a functional relationship with the formal staff. Prison code has significant variations in regards to certain types of prisoners i.e., murderers and thieves, and

6. The norm of the relations with the outside world means that the prisoner mustn't allow a mistake that could ruin the relationship with their own family members, for example. That prerogative is theirs only, not the prisoners.

Bearing all this in mind, we can safely say that the prison code is a list of unwritten rules and values with which the prisoners control each other, and as a compensation, a mutual support and a protection appears from the formal community pressures.

An important aspect of the functioning of the prison community is its social climate, composed by the interdependencies of the subdimensions as deprivation, the prison code (informal aspect of the prison), repression and disorganization (the formal aspect of imprisonment) that defines the direction and movement of this community in a complex environment in an effort to explain or use that for its own purposes.

The social climate was measured by a custom inventory of attitudes, originally created by R.H. Moos, in a closed-type prison in Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this paper, we focus on a prison code based on the values that the prisoners have in the space-time of a prison.

The prison code is a theoretical construct that has its reality in prison experience. In this paper, we present the correlation and multiple values of the prison code in relation to other subdimensions of the social climate from 1993, 1994, 1997 and 2016.

In all samples more than 80% of prisoners were included, except for 2016 were approximately 20% of prisoners were included in the sample. All the individual and multiple correlations of the prison code with other subdimensions are statistically significant (I will specifically present them during the presentation) and it seems that has a significant impact on a scenario that takes place in prison; ranging from a riot, to its normal day-to-day functioning.

In 1993. the prison code corelates (as dependant variable) with deprivations, repression and disorganisation (as independent variable) in value:

in 1993 R = K. DDORp = 0,35
in 1994 R = K. DDORp = 0,87
in 1997 R = K. DDORp = 0,65
in 2016 R = K. DDORp = 0,38

Multiple correlations of the prison code of prisoners in Zenica with subdimensions of deprivation, repression, and disorganization - during the year 1993 the prison code negatively affected to the homogeneity of the social climate and was in negative relations with all other subdimensions. During 1994, deprivations had a negative impact on all other subdimensions, but the prison code became the centre of events within the prison.

From the multi-correlation coefficients, it can be seen that in 1994, prison code covered the universe of the prison's social climate, acting as a general factor of the social climate.

During the observed periods it is noticeable that prison code also had the greatest variability. This means that the prison code is a powerful instrument in negotiations with formal system of prison and warns of the fact that it reacts to the quality of events both inside and outside the prison.

Certainly, the best scenario is when the prison code and the formal system have common goals and interests. In that case, it is normal to expect harmonization of the relationship between the formal and the informal part of the prison.

Delving in deeper into the prison community shows how the prisoners are the only community of actual people. Within this community a motivational structure and the structure of values are levelled out, the outside world is less real, less authentic than the inside one. The boundaries of that world are actual walls with armed prison guards.

Nevertheless, prison code is not an immovable term and it varies depending on a set of intervening variables, such as the level and the degree of deprivation (Cloward, Cressey at.al, 1960), repression, the singularity of treatment by the correctional facility, the general social prospects inside the prison and many other variables of incidental type and unforeseen events. According to our empirical experience, the measurement of prison code is the highest in the period of intense disorganising processes in the society, such as the environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993. It was characterised by the highest homogeneity of attitudes throughout the studied period, which means that the prisoners felt a greater sense of belonging in the prison community, compared with the other time periods. The greatest disunity of this subdimension aspect was present in 1994 and then again in 1997. In fact, until 1994, a slight differentiation among the prisoners was happening, which resulted in greater disagreements on the norms of prison code.

The examinees, who were not homogenous according to bio-psycho-social traits, seriousness and nature of their crimes and other characteristics, can easily unite around a common goal (reducing of sentences, easing the deprivations) but also around an exterior event. Psychopaths, that are the most active and that typically don't unify under normal circumstances but rather act individually and uniquely, because there is a chance of socialising their deviations. A possible hypothesis could be that a consent around a common goal homogenises and integrates the prisoners in a sort of prison code, which also represents the space in which it becomes possible to reduce the distance between the prisoners. Another assumption is that in order not to completely integrate under normal circumstances, when a

consent on a common goal is less likely, the differences between them become more easily exposed. (Šabani, 2005).

Within the realm of the prison code there is a process of taking on specific roles in which the individual expresses their attitudes that correspond to the majority of the prison population. Simultaneously, they take on a risk of receiving repression, which in turn is also a part of that specific role. A certain number of prisoners support this, but they don't express their attitude which is how they avoid the repressive measures. In accordance to their role, leaders are exposed to the group influence, but they themselves also influence the same group. We have noticed during our research that when it comes to the leaders, the observations of the group and the formal staff are the same. An example of this is an event from 1993, when one of the leaders refused to obey the guard's order and consequently got sent to solitary confinement. However, 23 other prisoners solidarized with him, suffering the same consequences. It seems that a conflict tends to equalise the actual sociometric leader with the perceived leader, even though some authors stress that under normal circumstances, trained analysts tend to attribute leadership to the individuals that are not chosen by the group, but instead imposed upon it, which is different from the sociometric leader whose influence is elected by the group itself.

The paradigm of this approach is the "right guy". Clarence Schrag (1962) assumes that the prison roles are a response to the prison community, that can turn into multiple groups of alternative roles. The more roles there are, the more responses there will be, which leads to a better balance.

Empirical regularities of groups of roles Schrag calls "configurations of roles", which mark the initiation of a role in response to a problem, onto which, in turn, yet another role can be initiated. According to him, the "right guy" is a configuration of roles, not a singular role. The most important configuration of roles are the ones that relate:

- Towards prisoners;
- Towards formal staff and
- Towards the outside world.

Based on these configurations of roles Schrag has developed a typology of prisoners, taking into account social and criminal background. Those types are:

- Prosocial prisoner;
- Antisocial prisoner;
- Pseudo-social prisoner,
- Asocial prisoner.

Social types of prisoners demonstrate systematic differences in cognitive and affective orientation towards both formal and prison communities. In the table below, "+" means a high level of knowledge or affective orientation that contains value judgment, while "-"represents rejection or limited knowledge and affective rejection:

Table no.1.:

Social types	Legitimate norms		Illegitimate norms	
	Cognitive knowledge	Affective orientation	Cognitive knowledge	Affective orientation
Prosocial	+	+	-	-
Antisocial	-	-	+	+
Pseudo-social	+	-	+	-
Asocial	-	-	-	-

It is easy to see that the prosocial types are consistent and with minor variations in the finding, but likewise, in the orientation towards legitimate norms or their bearers, and also towards illegitimate norms and their bearers. The same structure is present, but with opposite signs, with antisocial and asocial types. Being inconsistent, entropic, and having a tendency for compromise is a pseudo-social type of a prisoner.

We believe that the exchange theory explains these specific relationships because in the relationship of the formal community exists the same interests for order and stability, consistency of serving their sentences, safety within the prison and a chance of to get parole if the law and house rules are respected. Because of these reasons, prison code can be redirected towards certain benefits for the prisoners and the formal system can influence the partial fulfilment of prisoners' interests, according to the current normative and legal acts. Within this context, we define prison code as a certain negotiating exchange capital in relation with the formal system.

Exchange theory

Exchange theory belongs to a social behavioural paradigm in which the subject is the research of individual behaviour shaped by the reward and punishment mechanisms. The primary standpoint of behaviourism is that there are abstract categories like world, culture, structure, and values. All these categories are converted into operational definitions that measure the increase or decrease of a tendency or a behaviour. Behavioural sociology is interested in the relationship that exists between the effects of one's behaviour on their environment and their influence on their behaviour in the future. The basic concept of the behavioural analysis is the reward. The reward, which affects one is not a reward by definition. In order for the reward to become a reward, it must produce a form of behaviour. Whether something will be a reward depends on one's deprivation. Reinforcements that give birth to an understanding of a reward can be learnt, positive or negative. Individuals usually accept positive reinforcements because they increase the positive outcomes and the positive experience, which in turn shapes one's future behaviour. Negative reinforcement also increases the possibility of probable future behaviour, but it necessitates the act of removing something off-putting from the environment.

So far, we can conclude that the prison code could work in a positive direction, which contributes to a stability within the prison, if one can expect a reward (like reducing of a sentence) in a predictable and consistent way. That is why we have a basis for seeing

the prison code as an exchange capital. However, if the prison code is headed towards a conflict, it can produce, in a radical way, a prison mutiny which is decidedly undesirable for the formal system. Punishments are similarly a real-life situation. They are an act that reduces the frequency of a response, that is, it reduces or supresses the unwanted behaviour. Punishment can be positive and negative. Positive punishment is when we use stimuli that supress an unwanted behaviour. Negative punishment happens only when negative behaviour is suppressed, without any rewards. That relationship is called the price of response or the lack of reinforcement. This is the foundation of social control. Reinforcements are much more than mere result-driven instigators or catalysts for desired or undesired reaction. Multiple environmental factors pre-condition the reinforcement of an act. There are secondary and fundamental reinforcements in the social world. Generalised reinforcements of behaviour in the prison world are to reduce deprivations and improve social status. Reducing deprivations can motivate many different kinds of improvements and depending on society, conditions for the redocuments are set differently. Prisoners can modify their behaviour, systematically even, and thus make a positive contribution to the correctional treatment. This is a process which has the following stages:

1. Desired and ultimate behaviours are specified;
2. An existing nature of behaviour or response which is expressed is defined. In this stage the desired behaviour is defined;
3. All undesired environmental stimuli need to be eliminated; a stimulating atmosphere needs to be secured which is possible by using the prison code;
4. The standard or generalised reinforcements, like reducing of deprivations is used, in order to motivate one or even large groups of prisoners;
5. A clear concept of which desired behaviour leads to rewards is designed and
6. When a desired behaviour and an expected reward are reached, the prison code can be directed towards the idea that the sought-after behaviour pays off.

The theory of exchange is an attempt to apply the principles of behaviourism to aspects of social life. The most famous representative of this theory is George Caspar Homans[82].

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[82] He focused most of his research towards criticising the functionalism of E. Durkheim, C. Levi-Strass and T. Parsons. Homans disagrees with Durkheim in that, we should take into account other phenomena withing the interactions, not only those that are contained in the interactive process itself. They should be explained in psychological categories. He also disagrees with Durkheim's method, which is based on the assumption that something can be explained if we know the causes. Social fact can be explained with a social fact that caused it. The relationship between the cause and the effect needs to be explained. This explanation must be psychological, behavioural. Personal responses or behaviours are just intervening variables between the facts, that is, social facts lead to individual responses (Ritzer, 1997). C. Levi-Strauss was also criticised by Homans, especially for over-highlighting the collective and the attitude that a person is considered instrumentalised. This warns us that the theory of exchange is deeply micro-sociological. C. Levi-Strauss claims that there is a collective unconsciousness which is the source of real collectives. An exchange is a typically human product and he disagrees with the idea that it is just a product of interest; it is supported by the forces of collective and culture with symbolic meaning. The exchange happens also because of the social expectations which neutralise the boundedness of a collective. To put it simply – it's a moral fact. Homans believes that the exchange is a psychological and interest-driven category that moves through this continuum.

Homans' criticism of Parsons is mostly about the view on the concept of an institution. Firstly, he claims that institutions exist for their relationship towards other institutions in a social world. Secondly, institutions exist because without them society could not last or remain in balance. And thirdly, institutions change and possess a historical attribute, but those changes can only be explained with psychological categories (Ritzer, 1997).

The fundamental setting of Homans' theory is in the claim that the exchange is an interacting act which is psychologically defined because at least two members of a society realise it. We believe that even bigger collectives can interact within the act of exchange, like the formal and informal systems of a prison. An exchange is a behaviour which is an observable (or unobservable) exchange of activities, more or less a rewarding relationship between at least two people. He is interested in the elementary, social behaviour aided by the ratio of the reward to the price. Homans developed several assumptions for the theory of exchange:

1. Assumption of success necessitates the action of an individual, but also a rewarding outcome and the repetition of the action with the same or similar effect. The shorter the period between the behaviour and the reward - the higher the probability of behaviour that results in a reward;
2. Assumption of a stimulus means that the stimulus was a motivator toward the reward, and that in turn produces a possibility which the current stimulus will lead into action. This can be expanded to many aspects, but also the participant can change their behaviour for it to lead into the same result in the end. In Homans' conceptual infrastructure, expansion means generalisation and the behavioural change – discrimination;
3. Assumption of values that refers to the fact that an action has a reward as a consequence. It will be performed more often; thus, the rewards are actions for positive outcomes. Contrary to that, punishments are actions for negative outcomes. More frequent punishments tend to cancel out the behaviour with the same outcome;
4. Assumption of relation of deprivations – the satisfaction depends on its factual continuity – participants will become less and less pleased if it is prolonged and
5. Assumption of relation of aggressions – approval refers to a situation when a participant isn't rewarded with the corresponding and expected reward, or if an unexpected punishment is received. The result is an aggravated person and that behaviour is considered and alternative to the reward. The participant rewards themselves with the aggressiveness.

Another famous theorist of the exchange theory is Peter Blau. He invested a great deal of effort in connecting the structural-functional paradigm with the social behaviourism. The basic question that he asks is it at all possible to have a society with all the ever-increasing and more complex structures of merging people. He is postulating four stages of the process which start from the interactive exchange level and develop in the direction of social structure and change:

1st level – personal exchange between people leads to an increase of structure and potential future relationships. There are unknown variables within the exchange which are resolved with an interactive relationship;

2nd level – difference between status and power availability can lead to differentiation for example;

3rd level – legitimation and organisation create assumptions for extortion, for example and

4th level – opposition and change arise.

Social exchange depends on the rewarding elements, and rewards are used to strengthen the interaction. When there is an inequality in an exchange, a difference in power arises. However, in the real world there are possibilities of a participant to require something from another, but without the reciprocal value in return. What then happens is that people force others to help them, but alternatively they can find another source. What also can happen is that they still continue to function without the necessities or, ultimately, they can subdue to others and offer them general credit for any future exchanges. That is in essence a relationship of power.

Blau believes that this can be played out on a micro-level; however, when it comes to wider structures, they have their own autonomy and cannot be analysed using the micro-social instruments. Still, inside the wider structures, as an aggregate of small structures, a social interaction develops through a fact that participants must join a group and be accepted by it.

In order for this group acceptance to be adequate, rewards must be offered. Reward is an act of impressing or persuading the group members that a connection with a newcomer will be useful to them. The relationship will be cemented only when the group members are genuinely impressed, that is, when they get the reward, they expect. After being received into the group, competition and differentiation between members occurs as too many of them now are trying to impress each other using the reward capacity. This in turn can produce fear of addiction between the group members and lead into an involuntary acceptance of their attraction. Those who can reward the most, will gain leading positions. This is how a group inevitable splits up into leaders and followers. On a societal level, there are two kinds of social organization – one is a product of the exchange and competition process; the other is a product of the intention to reach specific goals.

The adjacent element of organization are subgroups or organizational subcultures. They are produced by the process of interaction, competition, and differentiation, as that sets the foundation for the opposition and conflict within the interactive drama between the leaders and the followers.

Exchange theory, according to Blau, at a wider, structural levels, is possible to recognize through the functioning of norms and values of a society. Namely, there is no physical possibility of all the societal participants of freely interacting, but the connection that binds them are norms and values. At this point, there is an accord between the theory of exchange and functionalism. Norms replace or compensate for unequal exchange, thus equalizing it. Norms and values are common in all complex societies and that is what holds them together.

There are four basic types of values:

- Particularistic type of values, as a means to personal integration and solidarity;
- Universal values are standards by which a relative value of the exchanged "goods" can be ascertained;
- Values that legitimize authority in a way that expands the borders of an organized social control and
- Values of opposition that allow for changes, they legitimize the opposition to those whose power has been legitimized by the values of authority.

Peter Singelman tried to integrate the theory of symbolical interactionism with the exchange theory. The starting point is consciousness, that is, being a human ability of imagining what others perceive, to define a situation and perform goal-driven pragmatic form of behaviour. The participant is the subject in both theories. In exchange theory, the participant subjectively ascertains different forms of reward, from the material to the symbolic ones, estimating whether the principle of equal chance of getting rewards has been violated. Human consciousness mediates between the stimuli and the behavioural responses. The reward on its own is not a reward, it is defined as a reward. As such it functions as a reinforcement.

Interactors are only interested in how actors shape and define interaction, while exchange theorists are interested in stabilising that relationship based on the reward system. Both approaches perceive the ongoing construction and reconstruction of interacting models and enforcements. Basically, exchange is a communication of symbols (according to Ritzer, 1997).

Singleman believes that:

1. During an exchange, participants construct normative and existential definitions of themselves, others, goals, and assessments;
2. These definitions tend to become shared;
3. When exchanging, people are defined by a shared nature of social definitions and
4. Within an exchange, behaviour, and definition of exchange changes only when:
   a. changes in the objective world express set behaviours and definitions as problematic and
   b. changes within some of the subjective definitions make objective conditions problematic (according to Ritzer, 1997).

Implications

Prison staff internalises the social-legal-normative system of a certain community. However, prison reality is also the prisoners' normative system and code. The prison code is an equal part of the prison and it functions with prisoners' help. It sounds paradoxical that a prison code is not only necessary for the prisoners but for the staff as well. Prison code tends to be a normative order with a prison community in a sense of a consistent definition what a prisoner can and what it is that they cannot do, all the while planning sanctions too. That legitimises the prison code, which is informal but present.

The prison code is an indisputably important theoretical construct that was born from the reality of prison. That is explained by the fact that recent criminological literature

dedicates significant research efforts towards this phenomenon, for example "The Palgrave Handbook of Criminology and Global South (2018)" dedicated the third part, named South Penalties, for the problems of prison and prison dynamics. In that sense, another study from David S. Fonsecae is notable – "Punishment at the Margins: Groundwork for a Revisited Sociology of Punishment". In the sixth edition of "The Oxford Handbook or Criminology (2017)", Ian Loader and Richard Sparks published a work named "Penal Populism and Epistemic Crime Control" where prison code is thought to be an aspect of informal control. Susan Easton dedicated a study "The Politics of the Prison and the Prisoner (2018)" to the prison processes within which prison code grows into a formal negotiating authority with the goal to ease the prison tensions and to harmonise the relationship criminal act – prisoner – punishment.

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