ЛОГИЧКИОТ СТАТУС НА ПРАВНОТО РАСУДУВАЊЕ: ПОСТОИ ЛИ СПЕЦИФИЧНА „ПРАВНА ЛОГИКА“?

Abstract

The fundamental objective of this article is to elaborate the main lines of the controversy concerning the existence of a specific ,, legal logic". The arguments pro and contra the specificity of the legal logic are organized along the lines of the famous confrontation of the anti- formalist and the formalist positions in logic, which took place in the sixth decade of the twentieth century The fundamental problem at the centre of this controversy has not been definitively resolved to date. The conclusion of the paper is in favour of the thesis that the answer to the question of the specificity of legal logic depends, in ultima linea, on the conception of „logic" to which we are prepared to subscribe, i.e. the narrow or the broad one. However, it turns out that the extreme positions in the controversy coincide from a practical point of view, because each in its own way stimulates in-depth research on the logically relevant components of legal reasoning.